The Impact of Knowledge Sourcing and Status Motives on Managers’ Knowledge Transfer Decisions

Presented at Tilburg University, ESSEC Business School, Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Groningen, and IIM Bangalore, HEC Lausanne, NHH, EAA Talent Workshop 2022, EAA Annual Congress 2023, AAA MAS Midyear Meeting 2024

Abstract

Knowledge sharing among business units is essential for organizational learning. This study investigates whether knowledge sourcing affects managers’ willingness to transfer knowledge from their unit to another unit in the firm. Using psychological ownership theory, I predict that absent status recognition from the corporate headquarters, managers will have a lower willingness to transfer internally sourced knowledge than externally sourced knowledge. I argue that status recognition attenuates the effect of knowledge sourcing on managers’ willingness to transfer knowledge. Using an experiment, I find that, contrary to my prediction, managers’ willing to transfer internally sourced knowledge is higher than externally sourced knowledge, in the absence status recognition. But, as predicted, I indeed find that the effect of knowledge sourcing on managers’ willingness to transfer knowledge reduces when status recognition is present than when it is absent. My findings contribute to our understanding of the design of control systems for reducing internal information frictions in multiunit firms.

The Spillunder Effect of Cognitive Intrusion on Task Performance and the Role of Feedback in Sequential Task Environments (Co-authored with Hariharan Ramasubramanian, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management)

Presented at AAA MAS Meeting 2023, AAA Annual Meeting (Virtual) 2022, ENEAR Conference 2022, Amsterdam Business School, HEC-ESSEC Research Workshop

Abstract

This study experimentally investigates the role of performance feedback in mitigating cognitive intrusion in a multitask environment. First, we examine whether information about future tasks results in cognitive intrusions and negatively affects performance on the current task. Next, we examine whether frequent feedback on the current task mitigates this negative effect. Consistent with prior research we find that when employees are informed about a future task, they tend to perform poorly on their current task because of cognitive intrusion. We predict and find that the negative effect of cognitive intrusion is mitigated when employees receive frequent feedback on their performance in the current task. Additional analyses highlight the indirect effect of intrusion on task performance through attention depletion and the mitigating effect of feedback. We contribute to the performance management literature and offer practical insights into the design of control systems that direct employee attention in sequential task environments.

The Role of Performance Transparency and Monetary Rewards in Task Assignment Decisions of Managers (Co-authored with Victor Maas, Amsterdam Business School)

Presented at Amsterdam Business School, ACMAR DC 2021, EAA Annual Congress 2024

Abstract

This study examines the impact of performance transparency and monetary incentives on managers' task assignment decisions. In each organization, there will be tasks that no one wants to do. Managers who need to assign such tasks face a dilemma: should they assign it to the employee who will likely do the best job even if this employee resents the task, or should they instead assign it to a weaker performer? We hypothesize that managers’ propensity to assign an undesirable task to the most suitable candidate is higher when they can provide employees a specific reward for doing the task and when transparency about individual performance levels is low. Moreover, we predict that reward availability and transparency interact in affecting task assignments such that the probability that the task will be assigned to the best candidate is exceptionally low in transparent firms where there is no reward available. Using an experiment, we find evidence that the assignment of undesirable tasks is indeed affected by the availability of a reward but we find no evidence of the hypothesized effects of transparency. The results of this study contribute to extending our understanding about the role of control systems in performance management.